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RESUMEN 
Este trabajo examina el proceso de convergencia en perspectiva histórica a ni-
vel desagregado. Tomando en consideración la producción, la renta y el gasto 
este trabajo muestra una gran diversidad geográfica y tempord. Cada país se es-
pecializó según su ventaja comparativa y la convergencia se produjo tanto a trav« 
de cambios en su estructura productiva, como a niveles microeconomicos. Asi-
mismo, variaciones en la proporción de las facturas condujo a una - j o r conve' 
gencia de la renta sin necesidad de una mayor aproximación de los precios de los 
factores. El trabajo demuestra también que persistieron importantes diferencias en 
iatio«». üi irauB^u „„.„mi^nres Así Dués, el proceso de convergencia a nivel 
las preferencias de los consumidores, ASÍ puc», " H „„ ;„ . .Vi™ U 
agregado no condujo necesariamente a la uniformidad de las economías. .Vive la 
differénce! 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines tbe convergence process at a disaggregated level in a 
histori IcomLt Adiree-waydisaggregationofthena^^^ 
income and expenditure reveáis a wealth of divers.ty, both over time and across 
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countríes, i.e. history and geography tnatter. Countries can specialise according to 
comparative advantage, and convergence at die aggregate level can occur dirough 
changes in structure as well as through convergence at die micro level. Similarly, 
changes in factor proportions may lead to convergence of aggregate incomes wit-
hout requiring convergence of all factor prices at the micro level. Also, differences 
in preferences may persist, so that individual components of expenditure do not 
need to converge in line with aggregate expenditure. Convergence at the aggregate 
level, then, does not necessarily lead to uniformity. Vive la différence! 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Most of the work on the convergence of productivity and hving stan-
dards among the advanced industrialised nations has been conducted at the 
aggregate level, using Maddison's (1982; 1991; 1995) well known national 
income data set (Baumol, 1986; Abramovitz, 1986; De Long, 1988; Feins-
tein, 1988). Here a breakdown of the aggregate picture is provided along th-
ree lines, using the traditional national accounting categories. The following 
questions are examined: 1) On the output side, has labour productivity 
converged by industry? Or have differences persisted at the level of indivi-
dual industries despite convergence at the aggregate level? 2) On the income 
side, have real wages and other factor incomes converged? 3) On the ex-
penditure side, have savings rates and the share of government in economic 
activity converged? 
The disaggregated data reveal a wealth of diversity, even as conver-
gence has occurred at the aggregate level. In short, convergence does not 
have to mean uniformity. Countries can specialise according to comparati-
ve advantage, and convergence at the aggregate level can occur through 
changes in structure as well as through convergence at the micro level. Si-
milarly, changes in factor proportions may lead to convergence of aggrega-
te incomes without requiring convergence of all factor prices at the micro 
level. Also, differences in preferences may persist, so that individual com-
ponents of expenditure do not need to converge in line with aggregate ex-
penditure. 
2. CONVERGENCE AND THE AGGREGATE DATA 
Data on national income and labour inputs for 16 advanced industria-
lised countries over the period since 1870 have been collected by Maddison 
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TABLE 1 
Comparative levéis ofaggregate labour productivity 
(US GDP per hour worked = 100) 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
UK 
Australia 
Canadá 
USA 
Japan 
Average of 15 
CV 
1870 
62 
94 
67 
37 
60 
70 
46 
103 
48 
54 
77 
115 
147 
71 
100 
20 
71 
0,44 
1913 
57 
70 
66 
35 
56 
68 
41 
78 
43 
50 
63 
86 
103 
82 
100 
20 
61 
0,34 
1929 
44 
64 
68 
34 
55 
58 
38 
84 
45 
44 
72 
74 
86 
69 
100 
24 
56 
0,31 
1938 
39 
61 
61 
36 
62 
56 
44 
72 
50 
49 
68 
69 
83 
61 
100 
25 
56 
0,27 
1950 
32 
48 
46 
32 
45 
35 
34 
51 
43 
56 
69 
62 
69 
77 
100 
16 
48 
0,34 
1973 
65 
70 
68 
57 
76 
71 
66 
81 
60 
77 
78 
68 
72 
81 
100 
48 
69 
0,13 
1992 
83 
98 
75 
70 
102 
95 
85 
99 
88 
79 
87 
82 
78 
87 
100 
69 
85 
0,12 
SouRCE: Maddison (1995), p. 47. 
(1964' 1982- 1991- 1995). The latest versión of the basic data is set out in 
Tab 1 and i usuaUy seen as consistent with the hypothesis that there has 
been unconditional convergence °f l^^our productmty and W^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^  
A A .k» ir^ rl.wtrifllised countries Abramovitz, 1979; 1986; Baumol, 
?986) ' ^ Z ^ : . r ^ ^ t n l ^ that Abramovitz (1979; 1986) stressed 
he r i l e S c T h up growth during the post-World War II penod and was 
much I L equivocal about earUer periods. The reasons for this cautton are 
Tnare^t n Table 1 The arithmetic average of GDP per hour worked in apparent in iable i. ine ^^^^ ^^  ^^^^ ^^^ ^^ ^^ ^ 
fifteen countries compared to tne v:)t\ icu n „•.,•„ (cv\ M\ 
nued to fall until 1950. Furthermore, the coeffiaent °f - ^ ^«"i^V /^^ 
only slightly between 1870 and 1913 and was ,ust as h^gh m 1950 as in 
1913. Although there was a substantia faU m the CV betwee" 1950 and 
1973, there was no further substantial fall after 1973. Given these fm 
berry (1996) for the distinction between condmonal and uncondit.onal g 
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dings, it is not surprising that Abramovitz chose to concéntrate on the pe-
riod 1950-73. 
Furthermore, De Long (1988) has questioned the validity of a general 
inference of global convergence from an ex post sample of countries that are 
now rich and have developed successfully. Maddison's sample deliberately 
exeludes nations that were relatively rich in 1870 but which have not deve-
loped successfully since and are now relatively poor. Henee convergence is 
all but guaranteed in Baumol's sample, but this tells us litde about the forces 
making for convergence among the nations that in 1870 seemed likely to 
converge. If East Germany, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Chile, Argentina and 
New Zealand, (all rich countries in 1870), are added to the Maddison sam-
ple and Japan (a poor country in 1870) excluded, we arrive at a sample of 22 
«once-rich» nations, and convergence is much less clear. 
Nevertheless, if we limit ourselves to the ex post sample of countries stu-
died by Maddison, it seems clear that unconditional convergence has occu-
rred over the long period since 1870, although not as rapidly as might be 
thought from a consideration of the period 1950-73 alone. For the purposes 
of the rest of this paper, I shall accept the convergence hypothesis at the ag-
gregate level and disaggregate by output, income and expenditure. 
3. DISAGGREGATION BY OUTPUT 
3.1. Comparative Labour Productivity Levéis in Manufacturing 
To the extent that convergence in levéis of GDP per hour worked has 
occurred between the advanced industrial economies, it is usually attributed 
to technology transfer in manufacturing (Nelson and Wright, 1992; Go-
mulka, 1971; Cornwall, 1977). In this section we investígate this issue by 
examining directly data on labour productivity in manufacturing. I show 
that amongst the advanced industrial economies over the long run, levéis 
and trends of productivity have often differed greatly between manufactu-
ring and the whole economy. Except where otherwise stated, all future re-
ference to the term labour productivity will refer to output per employee, 
since historical data on employment by sector are far more reliable than the 
equivalent hours data. 
The data on comparative levéis of labour productivity in manufacturing 
are presented in Table 2, drawing on the sample of countries in Broad-
berry (1996; 1997a). For a number of key countries the estimates are des-
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TABLE 2 
Comparative levéis of lahour productivity in manufacturing 
(UK outputper employee = 100) 
UK 
USA 
Canadá 
Australia 
Germany 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Sweden 
Denmark 
France 
Italy 
Spain 
Japan 
1870 
100 
204 
88 
100 
1913 
100 
213 
153 
138 
119 
90 
102 
79 
59 
24 
1929 
100 
250 
170 
102 
105 
102 
109 
94 
115 
82 
59 
32 
1938 
100 
192 
145 
101 
107 
117 
95 
100 
98 
76 
49 
42 
1950 
100 
263 
151 
96 
96 
88 
103 
118 
88 
84 
68 
32 
20 
1973 
100 
215 
153 
86 
119 
133 
104 
128 
89 
114 
96 
56 
95 
1989 
100 
177 
123 
81 
105 
128 
85 
121 
93 
115 
111 
81 
143 
SouRCES: Broadberry (1996; 1997a); van Ark (1994) 
cribed in detail in Broadberry (1993; 1994a). The basic methodology is to 
obtain benchmark estimares of labour productivity levéis from production 
census material and extrapólate to other years using tm:e senes o real out-
put and employment. In this respect, the methodology is very simüar to that 
of Maddison (1995), and used for a recent study of productmty m manu-
facturing since 1950 by van Ark (1993). However, m manufacturing. it is 
possible to provide independent checks on the accuracy of the time senes 
extrapolations because of the existence of a number of histor cal s u^^^^^^^^^^^  
comparative labour productivity levéis. For the pre-World War Penod Ae 
benchmark checks are based on the methodology of Rostas (1948) using 
physical indicators, whüe for the post-1945 penod benchmark estm^ates are 
baJed on compari;ons of valué added converted to I^^^^^IZZ^ 
using relative factory gate prices, folJowing the approach of Paige and Bom-
^ ' 1 t S be noted that most historical studies of comparative produc-
tivity in manufacturing have compared Britain büaterally with other cour.-
t J 2 : Henee Table 2 is'reported with the UK as the ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ - ^ 
her than the US since bilateral compansons are not stnctly transitive. lo 
her than ttie ^^'.^^"^^ ° ' nroductivity levéis in manufacturing and 
facihtate compansons between produciivuy „^„j„^tivitv in the 
the whole economy Table 3 also provides igures ^-^^¡f^^^J^ th 
whole economy with the UK as numeraire. In fact Table 3 is not quite the 
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TABLE 3 
Comparative labour productivity for the whole economy 
(UK GDPper employee = 100) 
1973 1870 1913 1929 1938 1950 1992 
UK 
USA 
Canadá 
Australia 
Germany 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Sweden 
Denmark 
France 
Italy 
Spain 
Japan 
100 
86 
61 
126 
60 
89 
41 
46 
57 
52 
38 
18 
100 
116 
95 
121 
78 
91 
49 
58 
76 
64 
46 
52 
23 
100 
139 
99 
109 
79 
113 
62 
59 
91 
75 
51 
33 
100 
131 
86 
111 
82 
103 
67 
69 
88 
73 
54 
38 
100 
154 
125 
111 
66 
93 
74 
90 
94 
72 
56 
37 
29 
100 
151 
127 
107 
112 
124 
90 
105 
103 
117 
93 
89 
85 
100 
132 
119 
102 
116 
111 
99 
96 
98 
129 
103 
98 
103 
SOURCE: Derived from Maddison (1995). 
same as a rebased Table 2, because Table 3 uses the number of employees as 
the labour input rather than the number of hours worked, since there is lit-
tle reliable information on hours worked by sector before World War II. 
The figures of van Ark (1993) for manufacturing in the post-1950 period 
suggest that hours remain substantially longer in Japan than in all other 
countries, which makes Japanese productivity performance less impressive 
on a per hour basis, while there has been a sizeable fall in annual hours wor-
ked in Continental Europe during the 1980s, bringing productivity on a per 
hour basis closer to US levéis. 
Now comparing Tables 2 and 3 there are some striking differences in le-
véis and trends. First, as noted in Broadberry (1993), in manufacturing the-
re has been no clear trend over the last 120 years or so in comparative labour 
productivity performance between the three major exporting nations of Bri-
tain, Germany and the US. Over this long period, labour productivity in US 
manufacturing has fluctuated around a level of about twice the British level, 
while Germán manufacturing labour productivity has fluctuated around a le-
vel broadly equal to the British level. This contrasts strikingly with the posi-
tion at the whole economy level, where the US has pulled substantially ahe-
ad of Britain from a position of broad equality in 1870, and Germany has 
come from a productivity level about 60% of the British level to a sizeable 
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productivity advantage over Britain. Clearly, then, the US forging ahead 
between 1870 and 1950 at the whole economy level cannot be explained 
simply in terms of productivity growth in manufacturing, although given the 
scale of the productivity gap in this sector, there is some role for the expan-
sión of the share of the labour forcé in US manufacturing. Similarly, Ger-
many's catching up of Britain at the whole economy level cannot be explai-
ned by trends in manufacturing productivity, but must be attributed to 
trends in other sectors and sectoral reallocation of labour, particularly the re-
duction of the labour forcé in low productivity agriculture. 
Second whereas the whole economy data m Table 3 are generaUy m-
terpreted as consistent with global convergence (i.e. all counmes convergmg 
on the same level of labour productivity or living standards), it is rather ea-
sier to identiíy a number of sepárate convergence clubs m the manufactu-
ring data of Table 2 and henee to see a process of local convergence. The 
countries have been ordered in Table 2 to identify these sepárate conver-
gence clubs by informal means, since there are ^^^^^"^"^ °J^5™^^^^^^ 
use the formal methods proposed by Durlauf and Johnson(1992). It i u e-
ful. I believe, to identify different convergence paths m the New World, 
Northern Europe, Southern Europe and Asia. 
For the New World, the figures in Table 2 suggest a high level of labour 
productivity in manufacturing relative to Britain m the United States th-
foughout the period since 1870. For the other New World count„es, alt^  
hough there are periods of high labour productivity relative to the UK, the 
trends are rather different. Although there does appear to be locd conver-
gence in North American manufacturing for much of the twentieth centu j , 
fhis foUows a dramatic period of catching-up by Canadá m the first decade 
of the r e n i e t h century (Altman, 1987). However, to really capture the 
oí me iwcuLicu / America it is necessary to consider per-
local convergence proc^ B a ^ Z i d ^ S - M a r t i n (1991) find unconditio-
formance across US « ^^^^^^^"^^ -^ „,,,,U economic activity rather 
nal convergence across ^l^'''¿'^Xiú^üy high levéis of labour pro-
than in manufacturing alone. Uesp te im^^y e<>rinn« decline in its re-
ductivity, Australian --f-^'^^a^^^^^^^^^^^ 
lative productivity position^ This ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^ economy level. 
ring has been worse than the relative declme at tne wn y 
Long run trends in the manufacturing sector of the New World, then, cau 
tion against simple claims of global ^^^^^^J^^^^^^ ^„ ,g ^ , p,,hs in 
Within Europe f re is e.den-^^^^^^^^^ con-rge^^^^ ^^g^^^^ P^^^^^ 
the North and the South, in Uermany, me a,,rtuMe(\ around 
and Denmark, labour productivity in manufacturing has fluctuated around 
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the British level throughout the twentieth century. Henee the expansión of 
the industrial sector, and particularly the reduction in the size of lew pro-
ductivity agriculture, have been important factors in explaining the cat-
ching-up on Britain which occurred at the whole economy level, particularly 
in Scandinavia and Germany. The picture is somewhat different in Southern 
Europe, however, with manufacturing labour productivity levéis substan-
tially lower than in Britain in the pre-World War II period. The figures for 
the post-1945 period, however, suggest that in France, Italy and Spain, 
convergence to average European productivity levéis has been achieved 
both in manufacturing and at the whole economy level. 
Turning to Asia, there has been a dramatic catching-up spurt by Japan, 
particularly in the post-1945 period. In contrast to the North European si-
tuation, where catching-up at the whole economy level has occurred without 
any substantial catching-up in manufacturing, in Japan the improvement in 
manufacturing has been much greater than at the whole economy level. 
Although Japan has now substantially overtaken European manufacturers 
on an output per worker basis and is continuing to catch-up with the US, it 
should be noted that on a per hour worked basis Germán and Japanese la-
bour productivity levéis in manufacturing are now broadly similar, as Japa-
nese hours are substantially longer. 
On the basis of these trends, convergence at the whole economy level 
should not be seen primarily as a result of technology transfer within ma-
nufacturing. It seems clear that there are still substantial international dif-
ferences in labour productivity levéis in manufacturing, particularly betwe-
en North America and Europe, and there is a large literature linking these 
productivity differences to choice of technology. It is not possible to survey 
fuUy this hterature here and the interested reader is referred to Broadberry 
(1994a; 1995; 1997a). Nevertheless, it will be useful to summarise the key 
ideas. 
Underlying the global convergence perspective is the notion that in a 
fully integrated world, productivity would be the same in all countries since 
they would all be using the same techniques. By contrast, the perspective of-
fered here suggests that countries with different endowments and demand 
conditions will produce with different techniques and henee with different 
levéis of labour productivity, an idea that draws on the famous Habakkuk 
(1962) thesis and in particular on the modified versions of Ames and Ro-
senberg (1968) and David (1975). 
I would see the higher labour productivity in North America as a result 
of a greater reliance on mass production techniques in the US and flexible 
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production techniques in Europe. The higher labour productivity in the US 
results from the greater capital intensity and resource intensity of production 
as well as from economies of scale associated with the production of stan-
dardised products. The greater prevalence of mass production in the US can 
be explained by both demand and supply factors. On the demand side, 
standardisation in the US was facÜitated by the existence of a large, homo-
geneous home market in the US compared with fragmented national mar-
kets stratified by class differences in Europe, coupled with greater rehance 
on differentiated export markets (Rostas, 1948; Frankel, 1957; Chandler, 
1990) On the supply side, resource intensive Amencan machinery could not 
be adopted on the same scale in Europe, where resource costs were consi-
derably higher (Ames and Rosenberg, 1968; Melman, 1956; Franko, 1976). 
Factor endowments reinforced these technological choices, with abundant 
skiUed labour in Europe making continued reliance on flexible production 
profitable (Harley, 1974). 
I would see the two technologies as coexisting so long as progress m one 
technology can be matched by imitation or adaptation m the other techno-
logy Although for most of the period under consideration in this paper 
technological leadership rested with American mass production techno-
logy, forcing European firms to adapt to survive, m the first half of the ni-
neteenth century technological leadership rested with British craft produc-
tion technology (Broadberry, 1994a; 1994b). Furthermore, smce he la^ 
1960S there has been a revival in flexible production methods, with ech-
nological leadership shifting to Germany and Japan, and American irrns 
being forced to adapt to survive. Note, however that these changes in te h-
nological leadership have not been accompanied by changes m labour pro-
ductfvity leadership; throughout the period since 1820 at least, factor pro-
portions and dema'nd conditions have given the US a labour produc^vi^ 
advantage. Note also that simply copying technology from abroad without 
adaptation would be unlikely to be a successful strategy because bus ness 
opportunities that are avaÜable to everyone cannot be profitable for ever-
yo'n'e. This is recognised widely m the business - ^ ^ g y k^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 
been argued forcefuUy in a historical context by Hannah (1995). Indeed t 
has been argued that one reason for Britain's poor performance m manu-
nas oeen argucu u.^i j„rina the DOSt-1945 period was that 
facturing compared with Germany during the post LV^J P 
r> • • • j u TT ;»^ <^;tcf<>s ton closelv while Germany buütonitsstra-
Britain copied the United States too cíoseiy, wi j 
teeic asset of a skilled labour forcé (Broadberry and Wagner, 1996). 
T ^ c o e x s ence of competing technologies, with both seen as rational 
m t h ¿ r:;eTtlve environments, can be modelled along lines suggested by 
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David (1975). Initial differences in factor proportions will be transmitted th-
rough time so long as technological progress can be characterised by local 
learning. Although «macro inventions» may appear to offer a country the 
opportunity to break free from such a technological «lock-in», in practice 
decisions on when or how to apply the new technology will be influenced by 
current factor proportions and demand conditions. This can be seen as an 
endogenous growth model in a stochastic environment with learning effects, 
and is consistent with the absence of global convergence. As weU as showing 
up in the productivity figures, the differences in technology between coun-
tries can be seen in the detailed evidence of writers making factory visits in 
different countries, going back at least to the 1850s (Rosenberg, 1969; An-
glo-American Council on Productivity, 1952; Daly et al., 1985). 
This brief survey of the evidence from manufacturing suggests that even 
amongst the advanced industrial economies the long run evidence is best 
viewed as supporting local rather than global convergence. In particular, 
there has been a persistent, substantial labour productivity gap between Eu-
rope and North America. 
3.2. Comparative Labour Productivity Outside Manufacturing 
Estimates of comparative labour productivity levéis in non-manufactu-
ring sectors for Britain, the United States and Germany are provided in Bro-
adberry (1997b; 1997c). As with manufacturing, the methodology has been 
to obtain benchmark estimates of comparative labour productivity levéis for 
the mid-twentieth century and use time series of output and employment for 
extrapolation to other years. Again, additional benchmark estimates can be 
used to provide independent checks on the accuracy of the time series ex-
trapolations. 
Figures on comparative levéis of labour productivity by sector for the 
United States and the United Kingdom are given in Table 4, taken from 
Broadberry (1997b) .^ For the pre-1920 period, employment data are only 
^ The comparative productivity level for the aggregate economy in Table 4 differs in detail 
from the pattem in Table 3 because I have been constrained to use aggregate GDP series that 
are available on a disaggregated basis. Thus, whereas Maddison (1995) uses the Department of 
Commerce series for the United States during the period 1929-50, I have used Kendrick 
(1961). However, the largest difference arises from Maddison's (1995) decisión to use a varia-
ble weight Índex for the United States during the period since 1950 in preference to the official 
fixed weight Índex. Benchmark estimates for 1910, 1937 and 1950 support the broad outlines 
of Table 4 (Broadberry, 1997b). 
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TABLE 4 
Comparattve leveh of labour productivity by sector: The United States 
andthe United Kingdom (UK = 100) 
Agriculture 
Mineral Extraction 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Utilities 
Transport/commun. 
Distribution 
Finance/Services 
Government 
GDP 
1869/71 1879/81 1889/91 1899/01 1909/11 
86,9 
103,1 
182,5 
95,5 
55,8 
110,0 
66,9 
64,1 
114,3 
89,8 
98,1 
99,3 
170,7 
138,8 
74,5 
146,9 
107,9 
58,4 
108,6 
95,8 
102,1 
109,0 
193,8 
164,3 
113,5 
167,1 
97,0 
53,2 
102,6 
94,1 
106,3 
147,3 
196,5 
139,7 
128,1 
226,8 
107,1 
71,6 
111,2 
108,0 
103,2 
162,0 
202,7 
198,5 
149,5 
217,4 
120,0 
77,9 
95,8 
117,7 
1919/20 1929 
Agriculture 
Minera] Extraction 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Utilities 
Transport/Commun. 
Distribution 
Finance/Services 
Government 
GDP 
1937 1950 1960 
128,0 
228,2 
205,6 
234,2 
295,5 
250,6 
109,0 
103,6 
97,9 
133,3 
109,7 
248,9 
250,0 
133,7 
335,9 
231,5 
121,9 
101,5 
99,4 
139,4 
103,3 
232,1 
208,3 
107,8 
359,3 
283,4 
119,8 
96,1 
100,0 
132,6 
126,0 
376,5 
262,7 
177,6 
573,4 
348,4 
135,2 
111,5 
116,2 
166,9 
153,1 
618,4 
243,0 
235,5 
719,9 
318,8 
143,2 
112,3 
110,2 
167,9 
1968 197} 1979 1990 
Agriculture 1 '^ '^ 
Mineral Extraction 700,9 
Manufacturing 242,8 
Construction 204,5 
Utilities 767,9 
Transport/Commun. 336,8 
Distribution l'*^'^ 
Finance/Services 121,3 
Government 104,4 
GDP ] ^ 
NOTES: Extrapolations based on 1937 benchmarks. 
SOURCE: Broadberry (1997b). 
131,2 
668,0 
215,0 
146,6 
590,8 
303,3 
149,6 
118,0 
101,7 
152,3 
156,1 
156,6 
202,6 
129,7 
523,9 
302,7 
153,8 
118,3 
96,5 
145,5 
151,1 
119,1 
175,2 
98,5 
389,8 
270,5 
166,0 
101,0 
93,2 
133,0 
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available at intervals of a decade. Henee, for example, the 1869/71 figure 
compares output per employee in the US in 1869 with output per employee 
in the UK for 1871. 
Perhaps the most striking finding is that over the last 120 years or so, 
Anglo-American labour productivity gaps have remained smaller in 
agriculture and services than in industry. The good productivity per-
formance of British agriculture in the nineteenth century has been noted 
by Crafts (1985), who argües that Britain's main achievement during the 
industrial revolution was to créate an unusually large industrial sector, 
which was actually quite labour intensive and therefore not characteri-
sed by particularly high labour productivity. It should be borne in mind 
that the high labour productivity of British agriculture reflected both the 
composition of output and the degree of capital intensity. The compo-
sition effect aróse as the product mix shifted away from grain towards 
pastoral products in response to cheap grain imports from the New 
World. By 1908, the Agricultural Census noted that livestock accounted 
for almost 71 % of net output in British agriculture. Thus while the 
United States supplied the world with cheap grain, the shrinking band 
of British farmers concentrated on livestock and livestock products, 
although even here they faced stiff competition from the New World 
and parts of Continental Europe. As Rostas (1948: 80) noted, the hig-
hest levéis of agricultural labour productivity were recorded in the parts 
of the New World concentrating on pastoral products, especially Aus-
tralia and New Zealand, and including Argentina before World War II. 
The high capital intensity in British agriculture reflected the moves to-
wards «high farming» in response to the increased competition from 
abroad (Jones, 1968). 
The relatively good performance of British services has been noted by 
a number of authors in recent years, including Lee (1986), Gemmell 
and Wardley (1990) and Rubinstein (1993), and it is reassuring to see 
that this is reflected in the comparative labour productivity figures. Ho-
wever, one caveat that should be borne in mind here is the difficulty of 
measuring output in non-marketed service sectors. In the national ac-
counts, the trend of real output in these sectors is usually proxied by em-
ployment, effectively imposing zero labour productivity growth. In an In-
ternational comparison the equivalent assumption that comparative real 
output is proxied by comparative employment builds in a comparative la-
bour productivity ratio of 100. Given the growing share of non-marketed 
services in GDP, especially since World War II, it may be expected that 
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there wiU be a bias towards convergence in the national accounts data 
(Griliches, 1994) '. , , , r , •,• 
A second general finding is that there has been a high degree oí stabüity 
in the Anglo-American labour productivity difference in a number of sec-
tors The persistence of the productivity difference in manufacturing has al-
ready been noted. In addition, there is a high degree of persistence of the 
productivity ratios in agriculture, distribution, finance/services aiid go-
vernment' Mineral extraction and utÜities are easily the most volatile sec-
tors with transport and Communications and construction also exhibitmg 
above average volatility '. This reminds us of the two basic ways m which 
the aggregate productivity ratio can change; first. through changes m the 
productivity ratios within individual industries, but secondly, also through 
structural change between sectors when productivity ratios vary across sec-
tors. A third point concerns the special nature of the volatüity m construc-
tion. Whereas in the other volatÜe sectors there is a clear upward trend in 
the US/UK labour productivity ratio, this is not so obviously the case with 
construction. Rather, in this sector the fluctuations are more abn to inverse 
Kuznets cycles or long swings, with British labour productivity approa _ 
ching American levéis in British building booms Although this pattern of 
inverse cycles has been much discussed in the literature on the Atlantic 
economy in the nineteenth century, its continuation mto the twentieth cen-
tury has been much less noted (Lewis, 1965; Thomas, 973). 
The results of a simÜar exercise for the Germany/UK comparison are 
reponed r í a b l e 5, taken from Broadberry (1997cX The sectoral break-
down is similar, except that finance has been mcluded with distribuaon 
rather than professional and pubHc services becauseof Germán data cons-
traints for the pre-1959 period. Also, output in the government sector 
has been explicftly proxied by employment here \ As m the US/UK case, 
government sector should be seen as residual « « o ^ " ^ " ' g f[°™ ^^ ^ loyment in the two 
built into the relationship between the growth of real output ana p y 
™ Í owever, the latter arises from the way that output in the government sector is proxied 
largely by employment trends. coefficient of variation. The stable sec-
' The degree of volatUity can ^ e - " f ^ ^ - J ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ X ' r a c t i o n and utÜities have cv's of 
tors have coefficients of vanation of less than 0.2, ^inerm ex 
about 0.6, while construct.on and " - p o r t / c o ™ ^ ^ ^ ^ , ^_ 
" Hoffmann's (1965) government output senes tor uerra y 
ture. 
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TABLE 5 
Comparative levéis of labour productivity by sector: Germany 
andthe United Kingdom (UK = 100) 
Agri culture 
Mineral Extraction 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Utilities 
Transport/Commun. 
Dist'n/Finance 
Prof./Pers. Services 
Government 
GDP 
Agriculture 
Mineral Extraction 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Utilities 
Transport/Commun. 
Dist'n/Finance 
Prof./Pers. Services 
Government 
GDP 
Agriculture 
Mineral Extraction 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Utilities 
Transport/Commun. 
Dist'n/Finance 
Prof./Pers. Services 
Government 
GDP 
1871 
55,7 
55,9 
92,6 
76,1 
31,3 
96,8 
89,7 
97,8 
59,5 
1925 
53,8 
106,8 
95,2 
65,7 
146,2 
140,0 
47,1 
86,7 
100,1 
69,0 
1968 
48,6 
135,3 
120,0 
105,5 
146,7 
130,0 
75,4 
101,3 
111,0 
107,1 
1881 
54,7 
72,1 
88,7 
113,7 
49,9 
126,7 
38,6 
83,4 
95,5 
57,3 
1929 
56,9 
116,4 
104,7 
50,2 
158,6 
151,2 
50,3 
99,8 
100,0 
74,1 
1973 
50,8 
138,1 
118,6 
117,7 
139,2 
119,5 
88,0 
98,4 
113,3 
114,0 
1891 
53,7 
80,9 
94,0 
90,1 
64,2 
147,5 
45,9 
77,0 
94,6 
60,5 
1935 
57,2 
123,6 
102,0 
70,6 
144,0 
132,4 
54,3 
105,6 
100,0 
75,7 
1979 
65,5 
45,1 
140,3 
130,2 
164,5 
135,0 
106,4 
103,1 
109,9 
126,5 
1901 
67,2 
86,4 
98,8 
100,3 
93,0 
195,1 
49,7 
76,6 
104,1 
68,4 
1950 
41,2 
92,4 
96,0 
84,2 
120,6 
122,0 
50,7 
94,2 
96,9 
74,4 
1985 
62,1 
25,0 
121,7 
111,8 
142,7 
132,7 
109,2 
105,3 
111,2 
120,9 
1911 
67,y 
101,2 
119,3 
117,7 
103,8 
216,9 
52,5 
76,3 
98,2 
75,5 
1960 
47,8 
132,1 
114,8 
102,0 
151,2 
117,0 
64,2 
85,7 
111,8 
94,5 
1990 
75,4 
17,5 
108,3 
117,9 
130,0 
125,7 
111,2 
120,5 
108,6 
125,4 
NOTES: Extrapolations based on 1935 benchmarks. 
SOURCE: Broadberry (1997c). 
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differences introduced by minor changes to individual sectoral time series 
show up in the differences between the «total of above» and the «GDP» 
series, with the former calculated from the individual series actually used 
and the latter taking the uncorrected aggregate data from the original 
sources. 
Taking the sample period as a whole, there has been a high degree of 
stability in the Anglo-German comparative productivity differences in a 
number of sectors. The persistence of broadly equal levéis of labour pro-
ductivity in manufacturing over this 120 year period has already been noted. 
The persistence of a substantial British labour productivity lead in agricul-
ture is equally clear, although the persistence of broadly equal labour pro-
ductivity in professional and personal services may be due at least partly to 
the use of employment as a proxy for output in substantial parts of this sec-
tor, something which is made explicit here in the treatment of government. 
The largest Germán comparative productivity gains occurred in the 
distribution and finance sector throughout the period, in the Utilities until 
1979, in mineral extraction until 1973, and in transport and Communications 
before World War I. As in the US/UK case, construction followed a pattem 
of long swings, with British productivity higher when a British building 
boom coincided with a Germán building slump and with Germán produc-
tivity higher when a British building slump coincided with a Germán buil-
ding boom. 
3. The Composition of Output 
The data in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that despite the trend towards con-
vergence overall, substantial productivity gaps have persisted in individual 
sectors. It may be expected that in a country where some activities are 
subject to inevitable productivity disadvantages due to geographical factors, 
specialisation according to comparative advantage would dictate the con-
traction of those sectors and the expansión of other sectors in which that 
country is not geographically disadvantaged. To the extent that sectors are 
subject to diminishing returns, this would tend to equalise productivity 
between countries in each sector. However, it should be noted that not all 
output is tradeable, so there are limits to this process. Nevertheless, in 
tradeable sectors it is clear that this process has occurred to some extent; 
thus, for example, the rapid decline in the size of the British agricultural 
sector during the nineteenth century as cheap grain was imported from 
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North America meant that the agriculture that survived in Britain remained 
high productivity, in contrast to the low productivity agriculture which 
continued to shelter behind tariffs in much of Continental Europe. Howe-
ver, the advantages of allowing the free operation of market forces to eli-
mínate an industry or sector must be balanced against the need to accu-
mulate physical and human capital in a path dependent world. It may be a 
mistake to sacrifice an industry in the face of a short run shock to relative 
prices if rebuilding capabilities in that industry is likely to prove difficult 
(Krugman, 1987). 
We now chart explicitly the differences in structure between the three 
countries of Britain, Germany and the United States, and examine how 
these differences have changed over time. Figures on sectoral shares of em-
ployment in the three countries are given in Table 6. A number of features 
stand out. First, the small proportion of labour in agriculture in Britain 
before World War I meant that Britain's employment structure was unu-
sually mature at this time, heavily skewed towards manufacturing and ser-
vices. This lack of a low productivity agricultural sector is very important in 
explaining Britain's overall productivity leadership during the nineteenth 
century, which we have seen was not due to productivity leadership in Bri-
tain's manufacturing industry. This view is consistent with much of the re-
cent revisionist work on the nature of the industrial revolution in Britain 
(Crafts, 1985). 
Second, note that in 1950 Germany had a higher share of employment 
in agriculture than Britain had in 1871. The big reléase of labour from low 
productivity agriculture in Germany after World War II was an important 
factor in Germán catching up on Britain at the whole economy level. Note, 
however, that the reléase of labour from agriculture has been accompanied 
by an increase in employment in service industries rather than in manufac-
turing. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Germany stands out from the 
UK and the US in the post-World War II period by maintaining its share of 
employment in manufacturing and avoiding deindustrialisation. 
Third, the rise in importance of service industries is notable in all three 
countries, particularly during the post-1950 period. The share of agricultu-
re and production industries (mineral extraction, manufacturing, construc-
tion and Utilities) has fallen from 74.8 % to 24.3 % in the US, from 64.6 % 
to 30.5 % in the UK and from 78.6 % to 43.1 % in Germany This suggests 
that the problems of output measurement in the service sector have now be-
come of paramount importance for contemporary measurement of Interna-
tional productivity differences. 
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TABLE 6 
Sectoral shares of employment (%) 
A. United States 
Agriculture 
Mineral Extraction 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Utilities 
Transport/Commun. 
Distribution 
Finance/Sei^'ices 
Government 
Total 
1870 1910 19)0 1950 1990 
50,0 
1,5 
17,3 
5,8 
0,2 
4,6 
6,1 
12,2 
2,3 
00,0 
32,0 
2,8 
22,2 
6,3 
0,5 
8,1 
9,1 
17,1 
1,9 
100,0 
20,9 
2,2 
21,3 
5,9 
0,8 
8,6 
11,7 
21,4 
7,2 
100,0 
11,0 
1,5 
25,0 
5,5 
0,9 
6,0 
18,7 
21,3 
10,1 
100,0 
2,5 
0,6 
15,3 
5,2 
0,7 
4,0 
22,0 
40,2 
9,5 
100,0 
B. United Kingdom 
Agriculture 
Mineral Extraction 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Utilities 
Transport/Commun. 
Distribution 
Finance/Services 
Government 
Total 
1871 1911 1930 1950 1990 
22,2 
4,0 
33,5 
4,7 
0,2 
5,4 
7,5 
19,5 
3,0 
100,0 
11,8 
6,3 
32,1 
5,1 
0,6 
7,7 
12,1 
20,2 
4,1 
100,0 
7,6 
5,4 
31,7 
5,4 
1,2 
8,3 
14,3 
20,9 
5,2 
100,0 
5,1 
3,7 
34,9 
6,3 
1,6 
7,9 
12,2 
19,5 
8,8 
100,0 
2,0 
0,6 
20,1 
6,7 
1,1 
5,5 
19,5 
37,5 
7,0 
100,0 
C. Germany 
1875 
Agriculture 
Mineral Extraction 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Utilities 
Transport/Commun. 
Dist'n/Finance 
Prof/Pers. Services 
Government 
Total 
SOURCE: Broadberryí 1997b; 1997c), 
1913 1935 1950 1990 
49,5 
1,5 
24,7 
2,8 
0,1 
1,9 
6,0 
10,0 
3,5 
[00,0 
34,5 
2,8 
29,5 
5,3 
0,3 
3,8 
11,2 
8,3 
4,3 
100,0 
29,9 
1,7 
30,0 
5,9 
0,6 
4,8 
13,5 
8,8 
4,8 
100,0 
24,3 
2,8 
31,4 
7,2 
0,7 
5,6 
13,2 
7,9 
6,9 
100,0 
3,4 
0,6 
31,4 
6,7 
1,0 
5,6 
16,3 
19,9 
15,1 
100,0 
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3.4. Analysis by Period 
It is instructive to consider the evolution of Anglo-American and Anglo-
German productivity differences during three periods. During the period 
1870-1910, the national income figures suggest that at the aggregate level, 
the United States forged ahead of Britain. However, there was only a very 
slight increase in the American labour productivity lead in manufacturing at 
this time. The large aggregate US gain resulted mainly from faster labour 
productivity growth in several non-manufacturing sectors, including mine-
ral extraction, utüities and transport and Communications, together with the 
effects of structural change. Of particular importance was the decline in the 
share of the labour forcé in agriculture and the growing importance of ma-
nufacturing, since both valué added per worker within the US and the US 
productivity lead over Britain were much greater in manufacturing than in 
agriculture. It seems unlikely that Britain could have avoided falling behind 
during this period on account of her inferior resource endowments. 
One striking feature o£ the Anglo-German comparison in Table 4 is 
that by 1911 Germany had a labour productivity lead over Britain in all in-
dustrial sectors, but still managed to attain an aggregate labour productivity 
level only three-quarters of the British level. This suggests that Germany 
paid a high price in terms of overall living standards for the policy of agri-
cultural protection, which kept out cheap New World grain but prevented 
the reléase of labour to higher valué added activities. 
Tuming to the period 1910-50, the United States continued to forge ahe-
ad at the aggregate level, although gains across the two world wars were off-
set by a faltering during the Depression of the 193Os, which hit the United 
States much harder than Britain, allowing Britain temporarily to narrow the 
gap. Manufacturing also foUowed this pattern during 1910-50, although 
larger US trend gains occurred in mineral extraction, utüities and transport 
and Communications .^ However, although British relative decline was more 
broadly based during this period covering the two world wars than before 
World War I, again it would be premature to talk of «failure», because it is 
not clear that better alternatives were available as the world economic sys-
tem disintegrated. To the extent that the British economy before World 
War I was driven by its position at the centre of a global system, the growth 
' The strong US productivity gains in mineral extraction and utüities are largely the result 
of composition effects, particularly the growing imponance of oil, natural gas and hydroelec-
tricity in the United States. 
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of autarky between the wars was a major threat to British living standards. 
The response was a shift of focus towards the Empire (Broadberry, 1997b). 
Imperial Preference gave Britain access to food and raw materials on ad-
vantageous terms, whÜe helping to maintain access to markets for British 
manufacturers. Although this was clearly helpful in maintaining Bntish in-
comes and living standards in the short run, in the long run there were also 
adverse consequences, since patterns of trade and capital flows were se-
riously distorted, creating problems of adjustment later as the world eco-
nomy re-integrated (Broadberry, 1997b). , , ^ 
Britain continued to retain a sizeable labour productivity lead over Ger-
many during the period 1910-50. As in the pre-World War I penod, Bri-
tain's lead over Germany was in agriculture and services rather than in in-
dustry together with the effects of a much larger agricultural sector in 
Germany The American forging ahead during this period was relative to 
Europe as a whole, and it was only after World War II that Britam was 
caught up by most West European countries (Maddison, 1991: 53). 
The third period, 1950-90, is characterised by a slow process of cat-
ching-up by Britain on the United States. However, the most striking fea-
ture of the catching-up process in Britain was its slowness compared with 
Germany and much of the rest of Western Europe, where catching-up on 
the United States proceeded much more rapidly To some extent, slower 
catching-up in Britain was only to be expected, given that the aggregate la-
bour productivity gap with the United States was smaUer than in other 
West European countries (Feinstein, 1990). Nevertheless, as we have seen 
this was not always the case at a more disaggregated level. Slow British cat-
ching-up in industrial sectors can be explained to some extent by the his-
torical legacy of heavy dependence on Commonwealth markets and the re-
sultant hesitancy in seizing the opportunities arising from the remtegration 
of the world economy However, most commentators also note problems 
arising from the adoption of American mass production technology and the 
resuldng poor industrial relations. It is noti^ ceable that British manu acm-
ring productivity performance has improved dramaticaUy durmg the 1980s 
with the rejuvenation of flexible P'^^uctioVechnology more suited t^ ^^ ^^ ^^^ 
tish conditions (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Mügrom and Roberts, 1990, Bro-
adberry, 1997a)I 
^ ^ í ; : ^ s h . . p r o v e c e n : . ™^^^^^^^^^^^ 
position effect, with the rise of the North Sea oü sector. 1 he mscovery 
an impact on the Utilities sector. 
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The spectacularly successful Germán recovery from World War II 
has been acclaimed widely as an «economic miracle» (Dumke, 1990; 
Giersch et al., 1992; Hennings, 1982). By the late 1960s, Germany had 
overtaken Britain in terms of aggregate labour productivity, having begun 
the 1950s with overall labour productivity less than three quarters of the 
British level. In Table 5 we see that by 1968, Germany had lower labour 
productivity than Britain only in agriculture and distribution/finance. In 
Table 6 we see that during the post-World War II period there has been a 
dramatic shift of labour from agriculture to services in Germany. In Bri-
tain, by contrast, agriculture was already very small by 1950, so that the 
growth of employment in services has been at the expense of manufactu-
ring. 
4. DISAGGREGATION BY INCOME 
4.1. International Comparisons ofReal Wages 
Williamson (1995) has constructed an altemative data set which offers a 
perspective on long run convergence. He presents annual estimates of real 
wage levéis for fifteen countries, going back to 1830 in some cases. The data 
are presented in Table 7 at benchmark years for ease of comparison with 
earlier tables. 
The first stage in the construction of the data is to obtain time series for 
the nominal wages of urban, unskilled labourers, usually based on the 
hourly, daily or weekly wages of building labourers. The nominal wage series 
are then deflated by cost of living Índices, usually for urban áreas with 
weights based on budget studies of unskilled labourers. The resulting real 
wage series are then used to extrapólate from benchmark estimates of com-
parative real wage levéis obtained by comparing nominal wages in each 
country with nominal wages in Britain and converting to a common cu-
rrency using a purchasing power parity (PPP). Williamson establishes three 
benchmarks at 1905, 1927 and 1975, which means that the time series have 
discontinuities at 1913 and 1945. 
Williamson's results paint a plausible picture, which points towards local 
rather than global convergence. Williamson identifies three groups; the 
English speaking New World (USA, Canadá and Australia); Latin New 
and Oíd World (Argentina, Italy and Spain); Other Oíd World. These 
groups correspond to the New World, South European and North Euro-
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TABLE 7 
Comparative levéis ofreak wages (UK = 100) 
UK 
USA 
Australia 
Argentina 
Germany 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Denmark 
Ireland 
France 
Belgium 
Italy 
Spain 
1870 
100 
167 
143 
184 
88 
84 
75 
41 
41 
52 
71 
72 
87 
38 
74 
SoURCE: Williamson (1995, 
1913 
100 
154 
199 
116 
84 
84 
65 
75 
89 
92 
82 
60 
85 
50 
46 
TableA2.1) 
1929 
100 
174 
122 
134 
105 
94 
130 
115 
112 
149 
106 
71 
48 
41 
51 
1938 
100 
229 
118 
128 
90 
79 
120 
117 
113 
144 
98 
67 
47 
42 
47 
1950 
100 
214 
104 
84 
59 
69 
96 
118 
118 
114 
75 
49 
90 
84 
57 
J973 
100 
167 
164 
76 
35 
107 
110 
116 
152 
143 
92 
78 
109 
95 
67 
1988 
100 
117 
129 
54 
22 
105 
93 
112 
123 
128 
109 
79 
97 
100 
92 
pean groups identified in the earlier section on manufacturing, apart from 
the linking together of the Latín New and Oíd Worlds via the inclusión of 
Argentina in the sample. . /,„o/x J D I 
Williamson (1995: 157) argües that Abramovitz (1986) and Baumol 
(1986) pay insufficient attentíon to the strength of the forces for conver-
gence before World War I, concentrating instead on the period of conver-
gence after World War II. To some extent this is explained by the data; in 
Maddison's (1995) GDP per hour data set the fall in the coefficient of va^  
riation is clearly much greater in the period after 1950 than before World 
War I, as can be seen in Table 1. This is not Ae cye in the real wage data set 
if the years 1850 to 1900 are chosen for the pre-World War I penod, as Wi-
i mson (1995: 159) notes. Since the pre-World War I and post-World 
Wa? I neriods are seen as periods of global factor and product market in-
Z ^ : n : t : i r : . ^o the'nterwar penod, Wüliamson (1995: 162) argües 
that we should look to market integration rather than technology transfer as 
the key to convergence. Williamson (1996) provides a survey of much of the 
empirTcd work in this área, stressing the globaUsation of commodity markets 
hrouXnternational trade and labour markets f ^ ^ ^ - i ^ " " ; ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
pre-World War I period. Such a conclusión does fit broadly with the scep-
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ticism expressed earlier concerning the role of technology transfer in ma-
nufacturing as a source of convergence. 
4.2. Wages and the National Accounts 
GDP per worker can be broken down by income source, just as it was 
broken down by sector on the output side in Section III. This enables us to 
see how convergence of income per employee is related to factor price con-
vergence. We begin with the national income identity: 
Y = wL + nK+dR (1) 
where Y is real GDP, L employment, K capital and K resources, with factor 
prices u), TC, and O respectively for the real wage rate, the real profit rate and 
real resource rent respectively. Dividing through by employment yields: 
{Y/D = w + n(K/L) + e(R/D (2) 
If we look at the US/UK comparison, we see from Table 3 that in terms 
of GDP per employee, the US came from behind to overtake the UK, rising 
from 86 to 116 between 1870 and 1913. Over the same period, Table 8 
shows that in terms of real wages, there was a fall in the US lead from 167 to 
154. The exclusión of Ireland from the British real wage data does not ex-
plain the discrepancy, because Ireland was gaining real wage ground against 
the US more quickly than Britain was. Furthermore, something similar 
happened between most European countries and the US over this period; 
real wages converged, but GDP per employee diverged. 
How can the real wage and GDP per employee data be reconciled for 
the period 1870-1913? The national income identity can help here, but let 
US distinguish between skilled and unskilled real wages and employment, 
with subscripts u and s: 
{Y/D = wJ,LJL) + u)l,L/L) + n(K/L) + d{R/L) (3) 
Since the forces for divergence dominated over this period, it suggests 
that convergence in unskilled real wages was offset by divergence in other 
factor prices or composition effects. I would see the driving forcé behind di-
vergence at the aggregate level as the faster growth of resource intensity and 
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TABLE 8 
Total gross savings as a ratio o/GDP ai current marketprices (%) 
iXvn.1Síi9 1890-1913 1914-1938 1939-1949 1950-1973 1974-1987 
UK 13 9 13,6 8,3 1,6 17,9 19,2 
USA 194 18.3 17,0 15,2 19,7 18,0 
12^ 14,4 19,3 22,5 21,5 
13 0 12,4 13,8 24,4 22,0 
^ ' 12,9 27,5 24,0 
^"•"«"y , 1,2 26,8 22,9 
Canadá 9,1 
Australia 11,2 
15 2 
Netherlands ' - , , -.^, 
France 12,8 14,7 23,5 ¿¿,) 
T 12 4 12 3 16,7 23,3 32,8 32,9 
>P^" ^^'^ • 43 8,1 27,9 
! í ° ' " 9 6 25:5 19,9 33,2 
laiwan ' ' ^^ , T „ ,n T 
India .^8 ''' ''' l^ '-^^-
NOTES- Canadá exeludes inventories 1870-1926; Australia exeludes inventories 1870-1913; 
• Germany entry in third eolumn is for 1925-38; Netherlands, entry in th.rd eolumn is 
for 1921-38- Tapan exeludes inventories 1885-1940 and entry in first eolumn is for 
1885-89; Korea, entry in fifth eolumn is for 1953-73; Taiwan exeludes part of mvento-
ries 1903-1938, and entry in second eolumn is for 1903-13. 
SOURCE: Maddison (1992: 185). 
capital intensity in the US. Although in a closed economy context this 
would be expected to lead to faster real wage growth in the US, it is possible 
in an open economy that migration offset this, at least among unskiUed 
workers. It would therefore be interesting to know what happened to skilled 
"^^^S general then, there is no necessity for individual factor prices and 
overall incomes to follow the same pattems of convergence or divergence. 
Movements in one factor price may be offset by movements m other factor 
prices, and there may be composition effects from changmg factor pro-
portions. 
5. DISAGGREGATION BYEXPENDITURE 
5.1. Consumption and Savings 
Maddison (1992) examines the issue of the split ^etween consum^^^^ 
and savings for a sample of eleven countries over the penod smce 1870. This 
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matters because in a world of imperfect capital mobility, investment in an in-
dividual country will be constrained by domestic savings, and convergence 
of GDP per head therefore requires convergence of savings rates. Gross sa-
vings are measured as the sum of domestic investment and investment 
abroad. We begin with the national accounting identity: 
Y=C + I+G + NX (4) 
where Y is national income, C prívate consumption, I domestic investment, 
G government consumption and NX net exports. Dividing through by na-
tional income, and writing lower case letters to denote variables as a pro-
portion of national income: 
l=c + i + g + nx (5) 
Rearranging, the gross savings rate (s) is given by: 
s-\-c-g = i + nx (6) 
Since the balance of payments must sum to zero, net exports must 
equal net investment abroad (plus the current account item net transfers 
abroad). Henee Maddison measures gross savings as the sum of gross fixed 
domestic investment (non-residential plus dwellings), net investment in in-
ventories and net investment abroad. Note that the use of the term net 
here refers to the balance of positive and negative flows; since there are se-
rious difficulties with adjustments for depreciation, Maddison chooses to 
work with gross rather than net savings. 
Total gross savings as a share of GDP at current market prices for eleven 
countries are shown in Table 8. The data are broadly consistent with the 
convergence hypothesis. There tends to be an inverse relationship between 
the level of per capita income and the gross savings rate; there is an accele-
ration in the savings and investment rates while poorer countries are cat-
ching up, and this is followed by a decline once most of the income gap has 
been eliminated. In Korea, Taiwan and India, the decline in the savings 
rate has not yet set in because these countries are still catching up. The po-
sition is less clear in Japan, because although on a per hour basis labour pro-
ductivity is still a long way behind the US, the gap is much smaller on the 
basis of GDP per head of the population. 
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TABLE 9 
Total government expenditures as a proportion o/GDP at current prices (%) 
1913 1929 1938 1930 1973 1987 
UK 13,3 
USA 8,0 
Germany 17,7 
23 8 28,8 34,2 41,5 45,2 
lo'o 19,8 21,4 31,1 37,0 
306 42,4 30,4 42,0 47,3 
™ a n y .-,- ' • 26,8 45,5 59,7 
Netherlands 8,2 ,2 , ^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ France 8,9 12,4 23,2 
Japan 14,2 18,i 30,3 19,8 22,9 33,9 
Averase 117 17,8 27,7 26,7 37,0 46,6 
C v " ' " ' o'n 0,42 0,27 0,19 0,21 0,20 
NOTES: Netherlands, entry in first column for 1910; France and UK, entries in final column 
for 1986. 
SoURCE: Maddison (1992), p. 196. 
3.2. The Role of Government 
Maddison (1992) also provides data on the share of government in eco-
nomic activity for six countries over the period since 1913. Table 9 sets out fi-
gures on total government expenditure, including transfers, as a proporüon of 
GDP at current market prices. Although there is a relative price effect, so that 
the increase would look less dramatic in constant prices, it is clear that there 
has been a real expansión in the role of government, with the rise of the wel-
fare state macroeconomic management, microeconomic regulation and direct 
State production (Pratten, 1990: 163). We have included here the coeffícient of 
variation which shows that as the share of government spending has risen dis-
persión has faUen. There is thus evidence of convergence m this ítem of ex-
penditure, at least among the six countries considered by Maddison. However, 
differences between countries remain quite large. The difference between the 
Netherlands and the US, for example, is quite striking, with divergence occu-
rring only since World War II. Convergence at the aggregate level, then, does 
not seem to require convergence of the government spendmg share. 
5.3. Preferences 
The above results suggest that whüst persistent d^ff-'^--^^ P f -
rences between prívate and public consumption are consistent with con-
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vergence at the aggregate level, persistent differences in preferences betwe-
en current and future consumption are not. This is because in a world of im-
perfect capital markets, savings affect investment, which in turn affects 
growth. The choice between public and prívate consumption, however, 
does not affect investment and growth in any straightforward way. 
6. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This paper has examined the convergence process at a disaggregated 
level in a historical context. A three-way disaggregation of the national ac-
counts by output, income and expenditure has revealed a wealth of diversity, 
both over time and across countries, i.e. history and geography matter. 
Countries can specialise according to comparative advantage, and conver-
gence at the aggregate level can occur through changes in structure as well as 
through convergence at the micro level. Similarly, changes in factor pro-
portions may lead to convergence of aggregate incomes without requiring 
convergence of all factor prices at the micro level. Also, differences in pre-
ferences may persist, so that individual components of expenditure do not 
need to converge in Une with aggregate expenditure. Convergence at the ag-
gregate level, then, does not necessarily lead to uniformity. Vive la différence! 
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